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Abstract
Background: Little research exists on patient safety climate in the prehospital context. The purpose of this article is
to test and validate a safety climate measurement model for the prehospital environment, and to explore and
develop a theoretical model measuring associations between safety climate factors and the outcome variable
transitions and handoffs.
Methods: A web-based survey design was utilized. An adjusted short version of the instrument Hospital Survey on
Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) was developed into a hypothetical structural model. Three samples were obtained.
Two from air ambulance workers in 2012 and 2016, with respectively 83 and 55% response rate, and the third from
the ground ambulance workers in 2016, with 26% response rate. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was applied to
test validity and psychometric properties. Internal consistency was estimated and descriptive data analysis was
performed. Structural equation modelling (SEM) was applied to assess the theoretical model developed for the
prehospital setting.
Results: A post-hoc modified instrument consisting of six dimensions and 17 items provided overall acceptable
psychometric properties for all samples, i.e. acceptable Chronbach’s alphas (.68–.86) and construct validity (model fit
values: SRMR; .026–.056, TLI; .95–.98, RMSEA; .031–.052, CFI; .96–.98). A common structural model could also be established.
Conclusions: The results provided a validated instrument, the Prehospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture short version
(PreHSOPSC-S), for measuring patient safety climate in a prehospital context. We also demonstrated a positive relation
between safety climate dimensions from leadership to unit level, from unit to individual level, and from individual level on
the outcome dimension related to transitions and handoffs. Safe patient transitions and handoffs are considered an
important outcome of prehospital deliveries; hence, new theory and a validated model will constitute an important
contribution to the prehospital safety climate research.
Keywords: Prehospital, Emergency medical services, Helicopter emergency medical services, Patient safety culture, Patient
safety climate, HSOPSC, Psychometric properties
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Background
The prehospital environment is characterized by time pres-
sure, high activity, uncertain situations, changing environ-
ments and a high dependency on the emergency medical
providers’ teamwork, competence and communication
abilities: a demanding mix, prone to errors. Undesirable
events and near misses seems to be more recurrent within
this environment than what is reported or shared [1].
Compared to the hospital context, little research exists on
patient safety in the prehospital context [2–4] and on the
relationship between organizational factors creating barriers
and increased patient safety [5]. Safety culture is considered
an important theme and premise for continued improve-
ment of patient safety [6, 7]. There is mounting evidence
on the relationship between improved safety culture and
less occurrence of adverse events [8–12] and improved
safety performance [13, 14].
Different from safety culture, safety climate is defined
as “surface features of the safety culture from attitudes
and perceptions of individuals at a given point in time”
[15], i.e. safety climate research is viewed as a ‘snapshot’
of the safety culture [16]. A growing number of studies re-
port on the value of safety climate assessments [14, 17].
Research also indicates a strong connection between safety
climate and safety behavior [18–20], and that safety-re-
lated outcomes such as accidents may be predicted by
safety climate assessments [21]. In health care such assess-
ments are conducted to reveal, keep track of, and manage
safety issues, in addition to evaluate interventions and
trends [6, 18, 22]. An area viewed as critical in the eyes of
the Emergency Medical Services’ (EMS) providers is tran-
sitions and handoffs, since this brief window provides the
opportunity to influence the further course of their pa-
tients’ care [23]. To make improvements in transitions
and handoffs, the first step is for the policy decision-
makers to understand how the workers perceive their
organization’s patient safety climate [24].
Survey methods are considered a good approach to
perform safety climate assessments [25], and several in-
struments have been developed for application within
health care services [15], some of which are also
intended for use within acute hospital settings [26]. One
such instrument is the Hospital Survey On Patient Safety
Culture (HSOPSC), developed in 2004 by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), and later
translated to several languages [27]. The Norwegian ver-
sion of the HSOPSC instrument was recently adjusted
and validated for the prehospital environment [28].
Another instrument is a rebuilt shorter version, the
HSOPSC-S, which has been validated for the hospital
and the petroleum sector [29]. HSOPSC-S was devel-
oped with the help of exploratory factor analysis (EFA)
to explore the possibility of a common structural model
for measuring the safety climate in two different sectors:
the health care sector and the petroleum sector. The
HSOPSC-S is based on a multilevel theoretical frame-
work, emphasizing that all levels in an organization have
safety functions and influence performance at the indi-
vidual level [29].
In the prehospital environment in Norway, car-, boat-,
and air ambulances constitute the main part of the EMS
activities. Although the different types of ambulances
has similar goals and tasks, there are also substantial
differences, such as team compositions, worker compe-
tence groups, care and treatment processes, and the
physical environment [30]. This makes it valuable to
provide a validated safety-climate instrument, suitable
for application in these different subgroups.
Due to the fast-pace work culture in the prehospital
environment, a shorter instrument seems beneficial, as it
may be challenging to perform frequent assessments of
the patient safety climate. There is also a focus in the
Norwegian health sector on developing shorter tools for
the measurement of health, safety and environment
(HSE) and culture [31]. As the prehospital setting differs
from the hospital setting, it is necessary to perform a
new test of the psychometric properties for HSOPSC-S,
preferably split into different subgroups. Such testing is
beneficial, as research on psychometric properties,
including the reliability and validity of replicated instru-
ments, is continually needed [32–36]. It is also recom-
mended to develop theoretical models to understand the
safety climate impact on outcomes [26]. The aims of our
study were to:
1. Test psychometric properties and validate an
adjusted version of Norwegian HSOPSC-S performed
on three samples from the prehospital environment:
two samples from the Helicopter Emergency Medical
Services (HEMS; air ambulance) retrieved at different
points of time and one sample from the ground
ambulance.
2. Test and further develop a theoretical model using
a structured equational modelling (SEM) approach
to create a fit for three prehospital samples, i.e. to
test the network of relationships between the
variables in a theoretical framework of HSOPSC-S
in a prehospital setting.
Theoretical background
Patient safety is a broad endeavor that requires thinking
beyond the individual patient to consider the character-
istics of the whole system [37]. It is reasonable to con-
sider the prehospital domain as part of the whole
healthcare system, and in particular as part of the treat-
ment chain. The importance of performing research in
this domain is reflected by the limited amount of pre-
hospital research on patient safety, compared to the
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amount of hospital research. Taking a multilevel per-
spective when performing assessments of safety climate
in organizations has been suggested [18, 38]. Figure 1 is
a simple illustration of a hypothetical prehospital multi-
level system model, on which we build our theoretical
structured framework.
Top and unit management levels
It is well known that leadership has a strong cultural in-
fluence on an organization through its beliefs and values
[39] and that effective leadership promotes better patient
outcomes [1]. Top management’s safety-related attitudes
and behaviors will form the basis for healthcare pro-
viders’ safety behavior and hence the organization’s
safety performance [1]. Middle management, i.e. unit
management, is responsible for transforming priorities
and values into operating procedures and action guide-
lines [40] and the view that top management’s influence
on unit management supervisory practices is aligned
with a multilevel perspective on safety climate [41, 42].
Supervisors achieve higher levels of safety compliance
from their subordinates if the subordinates perceive that
the supervisors prioritize safety [43]. The decentralized
nature of the prehospital setting, relative to the hospital
setting, is an important aspect in this matter. One might
speculate that prehospital unit management might have
a more important role, compared to that of their hos-
pital peers, in their influence on the integration of sys-
tems, patient safety interventions and staff performance.
With the help of coaching, mentoring and the fostering
of mutual respect, staff may incorporate management’s
priorities and values into their daily work, helping them
to develop their own leadership potential [7].
Different leadership styles seem to influence safety-
relevant behavior [41]. Several studies suggest that there
is a correlation between transformational leadership and
organizational outcomes [43–45]. Transformational
leadership can also function as an antecedent of climate
strength [46]. Transformational leadership is conducted
on organizational workers to raise their awareness of the
importance of task outcomes, to meet the team mem-
bers’ needs, and to induce them to prioritize the
organizational goals [47]. Effective leadership promotes a
setting in which healthcare providers are treated respect-
fully, consequently improving their performance [1]. It is
also essential that unit leadership behavior creates an
atmosphere in which team members feel they can com-
municate openly and participate in decision-making [48]
and speak up if they have safety concerns [49]. In
addition, the prehospital unit management conducts
leadership in the local unit by assigning teams to the dif-
ferent unit transport vehicles, from which the emergency
dispatcher allocates the designated teams’ medical emer-
gencies, transport assignments or similar. In the prehos-
pital environment, critical tasks are performed in teams
without direct supervision from the unit management,
which implies that the leadership task of putting to-
gether teams influences team outcomes.
Unit and individual level
For different high-stake contexts, a close relationship be-
tween teamwork and performance has been identified
[50–55]. Teamwork is generally considered to be the basis
for good patient care [56], and it is also valuable within
fast-paced unpredictable environments [57]. Teamwork is
also regarded as of critical importance in assuring patient
safety [49, 58]. Poor teamwork and communication have
emerged as contributions to medical errors [50, 51]; in
particular, a lack of cross-monitoring of the actions of
team members has been identified as a significant con-
tributor to teamwork failure [54].
In acute healthcare settings, teams are hierarchical [1],
and team leaders are responsible for executing oper-
ational procedures and action guidelines given by the
unit management [42]. On one side, the positive
attribute of hierarchy is the clear path of information
and decision-making in critical situations. On the other
side, hierarchy may hinder problem-solving, e.g. if team
members leave everything to the team leader and do not
contribute to collecting data or finding the best treat-
ment option [1]. Although hierarchy, formal or informal,
applies in the majority of the prehospital setting, HEMS
is an exception to this, as the team members are respon-
sible for different domains and tasks, according to their
profession.
In addition to effective leadership and teamwork, key
elements of a safety culture also include learning from er-
rors and developing an open environment based on trust
[7]. A recent study identified two effective interventions
improving the governance of patient safety within organi-
zations: simulation-based training is increasingly valued as
an effective method to enhance safety knowledge and
Fig. 1 Hypothetical prehospital multilevel model
Sørskår et al. BMC Health Services Research          (2019) 19:674 Page 3 of 16
behavior, and, secondly, the use of well-designed incident
reporting leads to increased learning, feedback and im-
provement within units [59]. Both are among many
activities that could be undertaken to create organizational
learning.
It is common to define organizational learning as
change in the organization’s knowledge that occurs as a
function of experience [60]. Organizational learning is a
dynamic process [61], meaning that, in addition to oc-
curring over time and between organizational, unit and
individual levels, learning creates a tension between as-
similating new learning (feed forward) and using what is
already learned (feedback). For the purpose of assimilat-
ing new learning in the prehospital setting, it is import-
ant that sufficient resources for effective and efficient
reporting are available [59]. It is also important to strive
for an open and fair culture to achieve open discussions
about things that went wrong and when, how, and in
what context they occurred [62]. In addition, such a
culture should encourage healthcare providers to report
patient safety incidents [7].
The degree of risk for the patient in a decision-making
situation depends on the healthcare providers’ (a)
awareness and knowledge of threats, (b) experience and
practice with similar situations, and (c) actual clinical
competence [1]. Individual team members’ behavior is
influenced by the team they work in, i.e. how they
communicate, support and supervise each other [37].
Learning is also dependent on other individuals; e.g., in-
experienced workers learn by observing more experi-
enced colleagues’ actions and related consequences [1].
Outcome: transitions and handoffs
Patient transitions and handoffs in hospitals have the
potential for errors [24, 63], and, recently, transitions
and handoffs have gained greater attention, also in the
prehospital domain [5, 23, 64–67]. Due to the character-
istics of the prehospital context, transitions and handoffs
are both challenging and complex as they involve a
number of different people, such as both hospital and
prehospital staff, patients, the public, and a range of
communication technologies and formats [5]. Several
factors could prevent effective and high-quality transi-
tions and handoffs, e.g. lack of understanding between
health care disciplines, inattention, variable quality and
quantity of information exchanged, and busy and com-
plex situations [68]. Some poor communication practices
are rooted in individual behavior, such as not listening, re-
lational issues, or misunderstandings [5]. Heavy workload
in the emergency department may induce reduced “active
listening” [64, 69–71]. Errors also tend to follow unsafe
behavior, e.g. when workers do not follow procedures or
rush to finish tasks [18]. A recent study found it disturbing
that they observed no effective interventions to monitor
or improve patient safety in the prehospital chain, consid-
ering the high number of patient transitions and handoffs
between EMS organizations [59].
Good transitions and handoffs are associated with
improved patient safety, continuity of patient care and
improved decision-making [64, 71–73] and are clearly
more than an exchange of information [65]. Quality of
care is dependent on the transfer of patient information,
and, since verbal transfer is often only 50% accurate, a
technical solution is likely to improve patients’ outcome
[67]. Nevertheless, due to the inherent complexity found
in healthcare settings and communication tasks, this in-
dicates that communication issues may not be solved by
technical solutions alone [5]. The quality and quantity of
information has been found to correlate with the ambu-
lance personnel’s level of formal training and experience
[71, 74]. To provide quality patient transitions and hand-
offs from prehospital to in-hospital, it is imperative to
have ongoing formal learning in interdisciplinary team-
work, communication and a structured flexible frame-
work in a supportive work environment [68]. Four
potential improvements have been identified for transi-
tions and handoffs from prehospital to in-hospital: direct
communication between the EMS provider and the
physician responsible for the patient’s care; interdiscip-
linary communication between hospital and prehospital
staff; standardization of many of the aspects of transi-
tions and handoffs; and improved information technol-
ogy [23]. There seems to be a need for a broader
conceptualization of patient transitions and handoffs, in-
cluding social and organizational factors, some of which
are embedded in the organization’s safety culture.
A recent study was performed on whether an organiza-
tion’s safety culture factors influence effective handoffs
within hospitals [24], especially the effect from an organi-
zation’s communication, teamwork, reporting and man-
agement cultures. They found that these safety culture
composites influence different aspects of transitions and
handoffs, i.e. information, responsibility and accountabil-
ity. Viewing transitions of care as a more specific variant
of patient safety culture attenuates ambiguity so that the
stakeholders may more easily identify and align with the
goals and processes of patient safety improvement pro-
grams [24]. Based on this, we made a major adjustment to
the theoretical framework that constitutes the HSOPSC-S.
The safety climate dimension “transitions and teamwork
across units” was replaced with the safety climate dimen-
sion “transitions and handoffs” from the original HSOPSC,
and, moreover, it was treated as an outcome dimension in
our model.
Theoretical model and hypotheses
In summary, we hypothesize that the prehospital safety
climate is aligned with a multilevel perspective, i.e. that
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the higher levels have an influence on the lower levels,
as previously tested in the hospital sector and the petrol-
eum sector [29]. Further, based on knowledge about the
prehospital setting, theory and earlier research, we
hereby argue that patient transitions and handovers
must be considered an important outcome variable;
handovers and transitions are the final ‘product’ of the
prehospital chain. As it is found that an organization’s
safety culture composites have an influence on patient
transitions and handoffs [24], we hypothesize that all
safety climate dimensions in HSOPSC-S have an influ-
ence on the outcome dimension “transitions & handoffs”.
The theoretical, structured framework is based on the
following hypotheses:
a. Organizational management support for safety will
enhance transitions and handoffs.
b. Organizational management support for safety will
enhance supervisor/manager expectations and
actions promoting safety at the unit level.
c. Manager expectations and actions promoting
safety within units will enhance transitions and
handoffs.
d. Manager expectations and actions promoting safety
within units will enhance learning, feedback, and
improvement within units.
e. Manager expectations and actions promoting safety
within units will enhance teamwork within units.
f. Learning, feedback, and improvement within units
will enhance teamwork within units.
g. Teamwork within units will enhance safety
behavior.
h. Learning, feedback, and improvement within units
will enhance safety behavior.
i. Teamwork within units will enhance transitions and
handoffs.
j. Learning, feedback, and improvement within units
will enhance transitions and handoffs.
k. Safety behavior will enhance transitions and
handoffs.
Hypothesis a-h are consistent with the original theor-
etical framework [29], and hypothesis i-k are adjust-
ments for this study. Figure 2 displays the hypothesized
theoretical, structured framework.
Methods
Population characteristics
In the prehospital environment in Norway, regional
health trusts are responsible for the EMS activities (car-,
boat-, and air ambulance). Regulations state that car am-
bulances should be staffed by at least two people; either
two emergency medical technicians (EMT) or one EMT
and another licensed health care worker with necessary
EMS competence, e.g. a paramedic, a nurse or a phys-
ician [30]. For the boat ambulance, at least one person
must be an EMT, in addition to the skipper. For both
car- and boat ambulances, the transportation of critically
ill patients may require special medical competence,
often provided by accompanying healthcare personnel
[30]. For the Helicopter Emergency Medical Services
(HEMS; air ambulance), regulations state that the staff
should consist of a physician/anesthesiologist and HEMS
crew member (HCM), both with the required compe-
tences, in addition to the pilot. HEMS is a high-compe-
tence service and represents the sharp end in the
prehospital chain [30]. The content of this paragraph is
previously described in [28].
The Norwegian HSOPSC-S and pre-testing of the instrument
The original Norwegian HSOPSC-S consists of six di-
mensions and 21 items. The response format ranges
Fig. 2 Hypothetical structured framework. Note: Management support = “Management support for patient safety”, Management exp. & supp =
“Manager expectations & actions promoting patient safety”, Learning, feedb & impr = “Learning, feedback & improvement within units”, Stop working
in dangerous sit = “Stop working in dangerous situations”
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from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly) on a
Likert scale. There are also seven items relating to the
respondents’ work characteristics (work area, geographic
location, field of competence, patient contact, work hours,
seniority in the prehospital area, seniority in position). A
pre-test of the instrument’s items was performed in
collaboration with prehospital professionals to ensure
correct terminology in the prehospital context. Although
minor adjustments had to be implemented, and some
items were pointed out as challenging in the prehospital
context, no items were left out or conceptually changed
before distribution of the survey. The HSOPSC-S items
is retrieved from [28, 29], and minor adjustments and
challenging items is thoroughly discussed in [28].
Data collection
The target group of this study consists of two main groups
of employees: HEMS and ground ambulance personnel.
The professional team composition of the ground ambu-
lance is very different from that of HEMS. A HEMS team
normally consists of a physician/anesthesiologist, a HCM
and a pilot. One base in Norway operates with a nurse
aboard, in addition to the aforementioned three-man
crew. The three largest professional groups in the ground
ambulance are EMTs, paramedics and nurses.
The HEMS samples were retrieved in 2012 and 2016,
and the ground ambulance sample was retrieved in 2016
from questionnaires performed in 17 (of 18) health trusts.
The 2012 sample was retrieved from a survey among
crew members in the civilian Norwegian HEMS. To
maximize the response rate, a commentary on the up-
coming study was published in the Norwegian Medical
Journal. The survey was distributed via both e-mail, with
a link to a web-based questionnaire (Questback), and an
identical paper version along with prepaid stamped re-
turn envelopes. Data were collected between May and
July 2012. All crew members received a follow-up phone
call as a reminder and encouragement to answer 2–4
weeks after the survey was commenced.
For the 2016 samples we retrieved e-mail addresses for
prehospital personnel in the Norwegian ground ambu-
lance and HEMS from prehospital system leaders. We
applied a web-based tool (SurveyXact) to conduct the
survey, and an individual link to the questionnaire was
distributed by e-mail to all personnel. Data were
collected between October and December 2016, and
non-responders received up to five reminders before the
study was closed.
Statistical analyses
Psychometric properties for the assessment of validation
were applied [75, 76], to evaluate the HSOPSC-S for the
different samples. Negatively worded items were re-
versed, and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was
conducted to analyze the construct validity and to deter-
mine the degree of fit between the constructed measure-
ment instrument and the sample. Covariation between
underlying dimensions was permitted.
The following indices were applied for global fit assess-
ment: Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR),
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA) and Comparative Fit Index
(CFI). Values for TLI and CFI in the 0.90s are generally
accepted as guidance values for an acceptable fit, and
those above 0.95 reflect a good model fit [77, 78]. It has
been suggested using a two-index strategy by reporting
SRMR with one of the fit indices (e.g. CFI or RMSEA),
with the guidance criteria CFI > 0.95, SRMR < 0.8 and
RMSEA < 0.6 [79]. A value below 0.5 is considered a good
fit for RMSEA [77]. Guidance values should be adjusted in
regard to both complexity of the model and to sample size
[76]; see Table 1. Chi Square (Χ 2) is not reported as it has
been shown to be problematic in model fit assessments
for larger samples [80]. The methodology described in this
paragraph is previously described in [28].
Modification of the instrument to gain model fit for all
samples was performed with the help of modification in-
dices and standardized residuals [75]. Values above 3.84
are statistically significant for modification indices.
Standardized residual covariances for the different items
should be below |4.0| and preferably below |2.5|; i.e.,
values above |2.5| indicate a concern with an item and
values above |4.0| indicate candidates for removal [76].
In addition, items with weak loadings were considered
for removal. The reader should be aware that such post
hoc modifications to models should normally be done
sparingly and founded on theoretical and practical
plausibility [81].
To assess configural variance, the GEMS and the two
HEMS samples were entered as a grouping variable
when CFA was conducted for the total sample of data.
Configural invariance is an approach to test measure-
ment invariance which is related to the concept validity
of measures. Configural invariance is applied to test the
samples together and freely without cross-group con-
straints [82].
To indicate discriminant validity, MANOVA (multivari-
ate analysis of variance; Wilks’ Lambda) was performed to
Table 1 Guidance values for model fit indices for models
consisting of 12–30 items
Indices N < 250 N > 250
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) < .08 < .08
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) > .95 > .92
Root Mean Square of Approximation (RMSEA) < .08 < .07
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) > .95 > .92
N = sample size. Retrieved from [76]
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investigate whether the different work characteristics had
an influence on the overall statistical variance of the safety
climate dimensions. To demonstrate convergent validity
for a latent construct, items with high loadings on a factor
should be observed, as they would indicate convergence
against a common point. All item loadings for a factor
should be at least 0.5 or higher (ideally 0.7 or higher) for
standardized estimates, in addition to being statistically
significant [76]. On the other hand, several loadings at
very high levels are not desirable, as this would indicate a
lack of discriminant validity for the factor items. A range
of loadings between 0.6 and 0.9 seems reasonable [75]. In-
ter-correlation between the dimensions was examined by
the Spearman-Rho correlation. Cronbach’s alphas were es-
timated, to determine whether factor scales yielded
acceptable internal consistencies with alpha coefficients
between 0.70 and 0.90 [83]. The methodology described
in this paragraph is previously described in [28].
After obtaining model fit of the measurement model for
all subgroup samples, the second step was to perform
SEM to test the hypotheses. For this study, we applied a
specified criterion that structural relations between two la-
tent factors should be significantly valid (p < .05) in at least
two of the three samples. This approach has been ad-
equately demonstrated in another study [84]. Following
this criterion, structural relations that did not meet this
criterion were removed so that a final robust model could
be established. Lastly, the final structural model was com-
pared to a model where all direct effects was estimated.
This is conducted to compare the psychometric difference
between the hypothetical and alternative model.
Confirmatory factor analysis (maximum likelihood)
was estimated using AMOS 25.0. The other statistical
analyses were performed using SPSS 25.0.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
For the 2012-data the Regional Committee for Medical
and Health Research (REC) South-East Norway (Ref.
number 2010/3326) reviewed and approved the study.
Participating was voluntary, and consent was given by
responding to the questionnaire. For the 2016-data ap-
proval was obtained from the Norwegian Social Science
Data Services (NSD; project number 45723). All partici-
pants received information regarding the purpose of the
study; they were assured that the digital questionnaires
were to be treated in confidence and that no participants
could be identified in the published material. Their
written consent to participate in the study was given at
the start of the survey.
Results
Response rates
The HEMS 2012 sample consisted of 172 (83% response
rate) individuals participating, with 145 (70%) completed
questionnaires. The HEMS 2016 sample consisted of
118 (55%) individuals participating, with 109 (51%) com-
pleted questionnaires. The Ground 2016 consisted of
1269 individuals participating (26%) with 1045 (21%)
completed questionnaires.
A few responses in both HEMS samples reported their
work area to be Search and Rescue Services (SAR) or
Fixed Wing air ambulances (FW), but these were
excluded since their mission profile and crew concepts
differ substantially from HEMS.
For the analyses, only returned questionnaires with all
items answered were used (listwise deletion). The major-
ity of incomplete questionnaires was discontinued early
in the survey, and we evaluated that replacing missing
values was not expedient.
Sample characteristics
The sample sizes are considered representative, based on
variation in demographic variables, e.g. distribution
across professional groups, range in seniority, and geo-
graphic location (Table 2).
The collected data clearly reflects the professional
groups in the Norwegian prehospital environment, and
also the difference in team compositions between
ground ambulance and HEMS. Respondents are evenly
distributed geographically between the four healthcare
regions, with a majority from the south-east region for
all samples. Such even distribution is also observed for
seniority in the prehospital environment, with a mean of
at least ten years. A high number of the respondents
worked directly with patients (97%).
Construct validity and post hoc modification of the
instrument
CFA was applied to determine model fit. For the original
instrument, acceptable model fit was observed for the
ground ambulance sample, while both HEMS samples
fell below this. Post hoc modification was performed to
obtain acceptable model fit for both HEMS samples.
One item was initially observed with a relative weak fac-
tor loading (< 0.5): item A11 (Ground 16: 0.46, HEMS
16: 0.15). A few items with at least five standardized re-
sidual covariances above |2.5| were observed: item A11
(HEMS 16, Ground 16), item C3 (Ground 16), and item
C4 (Ground 16). A post hoc modification, removing
from the instrument items A11 (when one area in this
unit gets really busy, others help out), C3 (whenever pres-
sure builds up, my manager wants us to work faster, even
if it means taking shortcuts) and C4 (my local manager
overlooks patient safety problems that happen over and
over), resulted in improved model fit for all three sam-
ples. Based on modification indices, items D2 (staff will
freely speak up if they see something that may negatively
affect patient care) and D5 (in this unit, we discuss ways
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to prevent errors from happening again) were also re-
moved, with the result that acceptable model fit was
obtained for all three samples (Table 3).
In addition, based on the two HEMS samples and the
ground sample, a configural invariance test was con-
ducted to reveal whether CFA achieved adequate fit
among these samples when they were tested together
and freely without cross-group constraints. The test in-
dicated that the resultant model achieved good fit
(SRMR: 0.048, TLI: 0.98, RMSEA: 0.020 and CFI: 0.98),
and conclusively, that configural invariance was ad-
equate among the samples.
The factor loading values for the items in the adjusted
instrument were in the range 0.56 to 0.92 (Table 4).
None of the dimensions had more than one value below
0.6 or above 0.9 for any of the samples. Following the
reasoning that the values should preferably be between
these two values, this indicated an overall acceptable
convergent validity.
The intercorrelations between the safety dimensions
ranged from little/fair (0.24) to moderate (0.59) degree
of relationship for the different samples (Tables 5 and
6); hence, no strong correlation (> 0.75) was observed
between dimensions. One correlation between “manage-
ment support for patient safety” and “stop working in
dangerous situations” was observed as not significant in
the HEMS 16 sample.
MANOVA was conducted based on satisfactory data
quality meeting different assumptions (normality, equal-
ity of variance, univariate outliers, and equality of covari-
ance matrices). By utilizing MANOVA, Wilk’s Lambda
was measured for all different employee characteristics
(Table 7). Although not significant for all characteristics,
overall, along with intercorrelations, acceptable discrim-
inant validity is observed.
Descriptive statistics and internal consistency
The mean statistics and standard deviation (SD) are pre-
sented in Table 8 for each of the measurement concepts
of the modified instrument, for each of the sample
groups. The patient safety climate dimensions with high-
est scores are “teamwork within units” and “manager
expectations & actions promoting patient safety”. Overall,
variance of items was considered adequate. Cronbach’s
alpha coefficients varied from 0.68 (stop working in
dangerous situations) to 0.87 (manager expectations &
actions promoting patient safety).
Table 2 Demographic and professional characteristics of the
three samples in the study (2016 samples similar to [28])
Characteristics HEMS 12
N (%)
HEMS 16
N (%)
Ground 16
N (%)
Sample size 145 109 1045
Professional group
EMT 544 (52)
Paramedic 260 (25)
Nurse EMT 146 (14)
Nurse 6 (4) 40 (4)
EMT Apprentice 24 (2)
Other healthcare 25 (2)
Administrative 6 (< 1)
Physician 74 (51) 53 (49)
HCM 39 (27) 31 (28)
Pilot 26 (18) 25 (23)
Regional health trust
North 20 (14) 20 (18) 192 (18)
Middle 32 (22) 23 (21) 202 (19)
West 37 (26) 23 (21) 257 (25)
South-East 52 (36) 42 (39) 394 (38)
Other 4 (3) 1 (< 1)
Prehospital seniority
Less than 5 years 34 (23) 26 (24) 195 (19)
6 to 10 years 39 (27) 26 (24) 259 (25)
11 to 15 years 23 (16) 19 (17) 211 (20)
16 to 20 years 22 (15) 27 (25) 180 (17)
21 years or more 27 (19) 11 (10) 200 (19)
HEMS 12 = HEMS sample 2012, HEMS 16 = HEMS sample 2016, Ground 16 =
ground ambulance sample 2016, EMT = Emergency medical technician. ‘Nurse
EMT’ represents nurses with authorization as an EMT. ‘Nurse’ represents nurses
without authorization as an EMT. HCM = HEMS crew member
Table 3 Model fit measurement model
Indices Guidance
values
N < 250 Guidance
values
N > 250
Original HSOPSC-S Trimmed HSOPSC-S Original HSOPSC-S Trimmed HSOPSC-S
HEMS 12 HEMS 16 HEMS 12 HEMS16 Ground 16 Total 16 Ground 16 Total 16
SRMR < .08 .065 .090 .048 .056 < .08 .047 .047 .028 .026
TLI > .95 .89 .86 .97 .95 > .92 .92 .93 .98 .98
RMSEA < .08 .066 .083 .036 .052 < .07 .054 .054 .031 .032
CFI > .95 .91 .88 .98 .96 > .92 .94 .94 .98 .98
N = sample size, HEMS 12 = HEMS sample 2012, HEMS 16 = HEMS sample 2016, Ground 16 = ground ambulance sample 2016, Total 16 = combined HEMS and
ground ambulance 2016 samples. Guidance values retrieved from [76]
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Testing of structural model
SEM indicated satisfactory model fit for all samples,
although slightly below the recommended values for
the HEMS 2012 sample (Table 9). Following the cri-
terion that paths should have at least two significant
relationships, several non-significant paths were re-
moved sequentially, starting with the highest prob-
ability (p). The final model fit remained relatively
equal to the model fit of the original structure
(Table 9).
Table 4 HSOPSC-S dimensions and items (the selected items have same wording as in the full PreHSOPSC [28])
Dimension / Item Factor loadings
HEMS 12 HEMS 16 Ground 16 Total 16
Management support for patient safety
H1 Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety. .86 .77 .82 .82
H8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority. .73 .92 .80 .80
Manager expectations & actions promoting patient safety
C1 My manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to
established patient safety procedures.
.85 .79 .85 .84
C2 My manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient safety. .91 .85 .90 .91
Teamwork within units
A1 People support one another in this local unit. .76 .84 .83 .83
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to
get the work done.
.77 .72 .71 .72
A4 In this local unit, people treat each other with respect. .65 .92 .81 .83
Learning, feedback and improvement within units
D1 We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports. .67 .71 .65 .68
D3 We are informed about errors that happen in this local unit. .80 .89 .74 .77
D4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority. .71 .72 .70 .72
Stop working in dangerous situations
A19 I ask my colleagues to stop work when I think the job is being done in a risky manner. .65 .62 .66 .66
A20 I report dangerous situations when I see them. .59 .81 .75 .76
B2 I stop working if I think it could be dangerous for me or others to continue. .69 .68 .56 .57
Transitions and handoffs
H3 Things “fall between the cracks”* when transferring patients from one unit to another.
(*For example, patient information is not transmitted, unclear responsibility for tasks
and procedures in patient handover.)
.71 .72 .66 .66
H5 Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes. .75 .86 .74 .75
H7 Problems often occur in the exchange of information across units in the prehospital chain. .66 .76 .69 .70
H11 Patient handovers are problematic for patients in the prehospital chain. .61 .76 .63 .64
Dimensions and items based on original Norwegian and English versions of HSOPSC [27, 29, 32]. HEMS 12 = HEMS sample 2012, HEMS 16 = HEMS sample 2016,
Ground 16 = ground ambulance sample 2016, Total 16 = combined HEMS and ground ambulance 2016 samples
Table 5 Intercorrelation (Spearman’s Rho) of dimensions for the HEMS samples
HEMS 12 HEMS 16
Dimension 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1. Management support for patient safety
2. Manager expectations & actions promoting patient safety .39 .39
3. Teamwork within units .48 .51 .26 .42
4. Learning, feedback and improvement within units .46 .41 .45 .31 .53 .28
5. Stop working in dangerous situations .39 .38 .42 .42 n.s. .39 .25 .57
6. Transitions and handoffs .41 .29 .29 .34 .31 .52 .43 .29 .40 .40
Numbered correlations significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), n.s.: not significant; 0.0–0.25: little or no relationship; 0.25–0.50: fair degree of relationship; 0.50–0.75:
moderate to good relationship; > 0.75: very good to excellent relationship [85]. HEMS 12 = HEMS sample 2012, HEMS 16 = HEMS sample 2016
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The final structure model with its standardized path
coefficients is presented in Fig. 3.
After the non-significant path removal process, only one
relationship remained non-significant. Surprisingly, despite
our hypotheses on the safety climate in the prehospital en-
vironment, none of the dimensions “manager expectations
& actions promoting patient safety”, “teamwork within
units” and “learning, feedback and improvement within
units” had two or more significant relationships on the out-
come dimension “transitions and handoffs”. The path be-
tween “learning, feedback and improvement within units”
and “teamwork within units” was also removed.
The path from the dimension “management support
for patient safety” to “manager expectations & actions
promoting patient safety”, and the paths from “manager
expectations & actions promoting patient safety” to both
of the unit dimensions “teamwork within units” and
“learning, feedback and improvement within units” are
all observed to have relatively high coefficients for all
samples. This supports the importance of management
levels influencing the other safety climate concepts at
both team and individual levels.
A post hoc test was conducted to compare the final
structural model with a model where all latent factor
were specified to have direct effects on the outcome di-
mension “transitions and handoffs”. This alternative
model indicated a good model fit (e.g. for the total 2016
sample; SRMR: 0.026, TLI: 0.98, RMSEA: 0.032 and CFI:
0.98). However, two of the direct paths on the outcome
dimension proved non-significant; “manager expecta-
tions & actions promoting patient safety” and “learning,
feedback and improvement within units”. Due to non-
significant paths, and as the hypothesized model is built
on a theoretical framework, the final structural model is
preferred over the alternative model.
Discussion
This study produced three major findings. Firstly, the
original HSOPSC-S measurement model provided over-
all acceptable model fit for the ground ambulance sam-
ple, implying that the original HSOPSC-S instrument is
adequate for distribution among the ground ambulance.
As it does not provide model fit for any of the HEMS
samples, no further psychometric properties were tested
on the original HSOPSC-S instrument in this article.
Secondly, a trimmed version of HSOPSC-S was observed
with overall acceptable psychometric properties for the
measurement model for both the ground ambulance
sample and the two HEMS samples, i.e. acceptable in-
ternal consistencies and construct validity. Thirdly, by
testing the theoretical, structured framework, we could
observe the dynamic relation between the management
and unit levels, which culminates in a significant influ-
ence on the outcome dimension “transitions and hand-
offs”. This is beneficial for an improved understanding of
the prehospital patient safety climate. The second and
third aforementioned findings indicate that the final
model, the PreHSOPSC-S, is appropriate for generalized
application in the prehospital environment.
Modified HSOPSC-S
By performing a post hoc modification of HSOPSC-S, the
results demonstrated a clearly better model fit for all sam-
ples in the measurement model. In addition, after removal
of weak items, the results also indicated acceptable con-
vergent and discriminant validity. It has been advocated a
conservative approach when performing modifications, i.e.
few modifications and clear interpretability [81]. The
Table 6 Intercorrelation (Spearman’s Rho) of dimensions for the ground ambulance and the total 2016 sample
Ground 16 Total 16
Dimension 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1. Management support for patient safety
2. Manager expectations & actions promoting patient safety .46 .45
3. Teamwork within units .37 .43 .36 .45
4. Learning, feedback and improvement within units .53 .58 .40 .50 .59 .44
5. Stop working in dangerous situations .28 .29 .32 .30 .26 .31 .32 .34
6. Transitions and handoffs .38 .29 .31 .30 .24 .39 .30 .30 .31 .25
All correlations significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 0.0–0.25: little or no relationship; 0.25–0.50: fair degree of relationship; 0.50–0.75: moderate to good
relationship; > 0.75: very good to excellent relationship [85]. Ground 16 = ground ambulance sample 2016, Total 16 = combined HEMS and ground ambulance
2016 samples
Table 7 Wilk’s Lambda
Employee characteristics HEMS 12 HEMS 16 Ground 16 Total 16
Geographic location .123 .048* .001*** .001***
Competence group .001*** .009** .001*** .001***
Work hours .005** .749 .001*** .001***
Seniority in position .814 .064 .108 .251
Seniority prehospital .750 .578 .001*** .001***
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. HEMS 12 = HEMS sample 2012, HEMS 16 =
HEMS sample 2016, Ground 16 = ground ambulance sample 2016, Total 16 =
combined HEMS and ground ambulance 2016 samples
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removal of five items may be argued to be a moderate
modification relative to the original 22 items.
A recent article demonstrates that items A11 (when
one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out)
and C3 (whenever pressure builds up, my manager wants
us to work faster, even if it means taking shortcuts) is
challenging due to respectively not reflecting work
processes and due to use of idioms, and should thus be
considered candidates for removal [28]. For items C4
(my local manager overlooks patient safety problems that
happen over and over), D2 (staff will freely speak up if
they see something that may negatively affect patient
care) and D5 (in this unit, we discuss ways to prevent er-
rors from happening again), it may be argued that these
items possibly reflect variance in local practices which
are not sufficiently coherent within the prehospital en-
vironment. Such variance may stem from the lack of
common explicit knowledge (procedures, routines etc.)
or tacit knowledge (norms, common understanding etc.).
In a hospital, it is reasonable that local practices (unit
level) is more aligned with regional (hospital level).
However, due to the scattered nature of the prehospital
domain this is not granted as such. As the argument has
not been sufficiently demonstrated, it may constitute a
hypothesis for future research.
Normally, modification may benefit on random vari-
ation in an obtained sample and should be viewed as
tentative until cross-validated with an independent sam-
ple [81]. In this study, the modification was performed
with its basis in three independent samples, either within
the same work area with a split of four years (the two
HEMS samples) or in different work areas (the ground
ambulance and HEMS samples). After modification of
the original measurement model and the structural
framework model, the CFA demonstrated acceptable
model fit for all samples against the recommended
values. The result of the post hoc modification is the
PreHSOPSC-S, which is a shorter – but stronger – in-
strument suitable for application in a broader prehospi-
tal environment.
As a shorter instrument, the PreHSOPSC-S may be a
significant contribution to performing safety climate as-
sessments in the prehospital environment. The prehospi-
tal environment is, relative to hospitals, geographically
scattered, and digital surveys are easier to distribute than
paper surveys. An issue with digital surveys is that they
Table 8 Means, standard deviations (SD) and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients
HEMS 12 HEMS 16 Ground 16 Total 16
Measurement concepts Mean (SD) Alpha Mean (SD) Alpha Mean (SD) Alpha Mean (SD) Alpha
Top level
Management support for patient safety 3.37 (.84) .77 3.08 (.87) .83 3.04 (.86) .79 3.05 (.86) .79
Unit level
Manager expectations & actions promoting patient safety 3.95 (.78) .87 3.98 (.74) .81 3.51 (.98) .87 3.56 (.97) .87
Teamwork within units 4.22 (.63) .77 4.58 (.60) .86 4.07 (.70) .82 4.12 (.71) .83
Learning, feedback and improvement within units 3.67 (.76) .77 3.89 (.77) .79 3.07 (.80) .74 3.15 (.83) .76
Individual behavior
Stop working in dangerous situations 4.11 (.57) .68 4.25 (.55) .74 4.08 (.58) .69 4.10 (.58) .70
Outcome dimension
Transitions and handoffs 3.32 (.65) .78 3.48 (.66) .85 3.39 (.66) .77 3.40 (.66) .78
HEMS 12 = HEMS sample 2012, HEMS 16 = HEMS sample 2016, Ground 16 = ground ambulance sample 2016, Total 16 = combined HEMS and ground ambulance
2016 samples
Table 9 Model fit structure model
Indices Guidance
values
N < 250 Guidance
values
N > 250
Original structure Trimmed structure Original structure Trimmed structure
HEMS 12 HEMS 16 HEMS 12 HEMS 16 Ground 16 Total 16 Ground 16 Total 16
SRMR < .08 .070 .060 .071 .062 < .08 .044 .040 .050 .046
TLI > .95 .94 .96 .94 .96 > .92 .96 .97 .96 .96
RMSEA < .08 .053 .051 .054 .048 < .07 .043 .040 .045 .042
CFI > .95 .95 .97 .95 .97 > .92 .97 .97 .96 .97
N = sample size. HEMS 12 = HEMS sample 2012, HEMS 16 = HEMS sample 2016, Ground 16 = ground ambulance sample 2016, Total 16 = combined HEMS and
ground ambulance 2016 samples. Guidance values retrieved from [76]
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may generate a relatively lower response rate [86], and a
shorter version may increase the response rate and rep-
resentativeness. In addition, the practical administering
and analysis of a shorter survey makes it easier to per-
form more frequent measuring. It has been demon-
strated that received feedback improves safety climate
[87], which implies that providing feedback based on the
measurement results to the EMS providers may also re-
sult in improved safety climate. An effective approach
for more frequent measuring is to attach the survey to
existing frequently performed measuring tools such as
employee surveys or re-certification tests.
The original full version of the Norwegian HSOPSC
comprises 13 safety climate dimensions, consisting of
46 items, in addition to two single-item outcome items
[29, 35], and a relevant question is whether the Pre-
HSOPSC-S is to be preferred over the original full
HSOPSC. In study design, it has become more import-
ant to consider specific measurement instruments, level
of analysis and the selection of outcome measures [88].
Whether the original or the short version should be ap-
plied for measurements depends on the objectives. If ef-
ficiency, speed and frequent measurement constitute
the goal, a shorter version may be preferred. On the
other hand, if an organization is conducting compre-
hensive improvement programs, and there is a desire to
measure changes in the patient safety climate, a full
version covering all dimensions may be preferred. In
essence, different objectives require different measuring
instruments, implying that several validated instru-
ments with different perspectives and outcomes are
beneficial for both assessments of and research on pa-
tient safety climate in the prehospital domain.
Theoretical and practical implications
A structural model is valuable for understanding the
multilevel relationships in the prehospital domain. The
structured framework for the prehospital environment
based on our results is illustrated in Fig. 4.
The final model was observed with relational paths from
top management via unit management and unit level to
the individual level, supporting the basic principle of
multilevel safety climate [38]. This observed hierarchical
relationship between levels implies that the change of
patient safety climate on one level would influence subor-
dinate levels, ultimately affecting safety outcomes. All
samples supported a strong positive influence from top
management on unit management, and from unit man-
agement on the unit level. Based on the theoretical frame-
work on which HSOPSC-S is based, several strategies may
be chosen for how to use the structural components in
improving safety in organizational settings [29]. An
example of such a strategy is to define and implement a
multilevel safety program, whose goal is to improve safety
culture and safety behavior [89]. Top management may
put patient safety on the agenda, integrating it into pol-
icies and agendas, ensuring that unit management adopts
these into practice. Another strategy is leadership develop-
ment initiatives to improve the safety climate [90], involv-
ing leaders on all levels.
Top management level influence on transitions & handoffs
The direct path from the top management level dimen-
sion “management support to patient safety” on the out-
come dimension “transitions and handoffs” may be
related to the EMS providers’ perception of the overall
healthcare system. This implies that top management
Fig. 3 Standardized path coefficient. Note: HEMS 12 = HEMS sample 2012, HEMS 16 = HEMS sample 2016, Ground 16 = ground ambulance
sample 2016, Total 16 = combined HEMS and ground ambulance 2016 samples. Management support = “Management support for patient safety”,
Management exp. & supp = “Manager expectations & actions promoting patient safety”, Learning, feedb & impr = “Learning, feedback &
improvement within units”, Stop working in dangerous sit = “Stop working in dangerous situations”. n.s. = not significant, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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has an important direct role in patient safety in transi-
tions and handoffs, through the quality of internal work
processes, procedures and routines for patient transi-
tions and handoffs in the prehospital domain. Patient
transitions and handoffs are also organizational inter-
faces [91]. When commencing transitions and handoffs
between the prehospital and hospital domains, EMS
workers may perceive this as an interface, where both
these cultural domains influence the outcome of patient
transitions and handoffs. This may be seen in light of pa-
tient transitions and handoffs being considered an im-
portant area of contact between employees and the
hospital [23]. An implication of this is that the better the
EMS providers perceive the management support to
patient safety, the better they perceive the hospital
management effort to provide and maintain effective
and safe systems for transitions and handoffs. In essence,
top management’s expressed values and priorities are
important for obtaining improved outcomes.
Unit level influence on transitions & handoffs
The lack of a direct path from the outcome dimension
“transitions and handoffs” to both of the unit levels “team-
work within units” and “learning, feedback and improve-
ment within units”, demonstrates a full mediation by
individual safety behavior. An implication of this finding is
that workers’ perception of the safety climate within the
unit differs from their perception of the safety climate in
transition and handoff situations. This observation was
surprising, as safe transitions and handoffs have been
linked to interdisciplinary team effort and team communi-
cation skills [69]. The explanation may be that transitions
and handoffs often involve collaboration across units in
the prehospital chain, which implies that the safety climate
in this broader domain is different from the safety climate
related to teamwork within the unit.
Another explanation may be related to the fact that
two of the three samples applied in this study are re-
trieved from HEMS workers. In the ground ambulance,
tasks related to patient diagnostics, treatment, transi-
tions and handoffs are often shared by the team. The
composition of a HEMS team has a higher degree of in-
dividual professionalism than that of other prehospital
team compositions, with each professional having their
defined set of tasks and areas for which they are respon-
sible [30]. The physician in HEMS is mainly responsible
for patient diagnostics and treatment, in addition to
transitions and handoffs, i.e. transfer of patient informa-
tion, responsibility and accountability. However, patient
safety processes and climate within the unit influence
the individual behavior, hence having an indirect influ-
ence on the outcome of transitions and handoffs. This
implies the importance of the continued focus on team-
work and the focus on learning, feedback and improve-
ment within the unit.
Individual level influence on transitions & handoffs
The dimension “stop working in dangerous situations” is
a particular type of safety behavior [29], and in practice
such behavior is likely to be primarily related to high-
risk tasks in the prehospital domain such as driving [92]
or clinical judgement and decision-making [2, 93]. An
example of “stop working” behavior is cross-monitoring,
i.e. the possibility to ask critical questions or voice con-
cerns if one believes that an action may harm the patient
[56, 63]. The direct path from the safety behavior dimen-
sion “stop working in dangerous situations” to the out-
come dimension “transitions and handoffs” implies that,
if individuals perceive that they can “stop working” when
performing safety-related tasks, it also increases quality
and safety in the individual tasks related to patient tran-
sitions and handoffs. Implementing different “stop work-
ing” techniques in training programs, simultaneously
Fig. 4 Structured framework for the prehospital environment. Note: Management support = “Management support for patient safety”,
Management exp. & supp = “Manager expectations & actions promoting patient safety”, Learning, feedb & impr = “Learning, feedback &
improvement within units”, Stop working in dangerous sit = “Stop working in dangerous situations”
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with promoting and cultivating such behavior, is likely
to improve both the outcome of transitions and hand-
offs, as well as overall patient safety.
Limitations and future research
The response rate for the ground ambulance sample was
low relative to other similar studies [32–34, 36, 94]. This
may induce non-response bias, meaning that the group
of non-responders differs from the group of responders.
See [28] for an extended discussion on possible reasons
for the low response for the sample retrieved in 2016.
The two HEMS samples had higher response rates, but
sample sizes are relatively small, thus increasing the like-
lihood for Type II errors. However, being able to test on
all these three different samples outweighs the overall
likelihood for Type II errors.
A disadvantage of a modified instrument is the lack of
opportunity to compare with other studies undertaken.
Although the PreHSOPSC-S is tested for a major part of
the prehospital environment, further research should
test and validate the instruments (both original and
modified) for other parts, to obtain a more generalized
instrument for measuring safety climate. Use of the in-
strument in a new context is a limitation in itself, and
development of a new instrument targeted on an pre-
hospital context may be a better solution. However, we
have demonstrated both a multilevel structural relation-
ship and a relational effect from safety climate dimen-
sions on patient transitions and handoffs, which may be
included when designing new instruments.
PreHSOPSC-S is based on self-reported data and has
not been tested for predictive validity, i.e. not compared
with an external criterion [75], such as degree of error
reporting, degree of patient compensation due to harm,
or effect of intervention. Before such testing against
external criteria is undertaken, the impact on the pre-
hospital safety climate is not fully known.
Conclusion
Researching and measuring safety climate may provide a
valuable input in responding to potential patient safety
issues in the prehospital domain. Normally, relative few
dimensions are addressed at a time when performing ac-
tions to improve the safety climate [15]. Through use of
a multilevel approach, safety programs may be designed
to include several levels and safety climate dimensions,
simultaneously. The literature suggests to start with
surveys when initiating the process of measuring the
current safety climate status [95, 96]. Hence, it is satisfy-
ing to provide a validated instrument for measuring the
patient safety climate with a multilevel perspective in a
broader prehospital context: the PreHSOPSC-S. The
validity for use throughout the prehospital domain is
utterly demonstrated by the uniqueness of the samples,
as the HEMS differs substantially from the ground ambu-
lance, and the two HEMS samples were retrieved at two
points in time. This study also demonstrated that the
multilevel patient safety climate is positively related to the
outcome dimension related to patient transitions and
handoffs. To our knowledge, this is the first prehospital
patient safety climate study with a multilevel perspective
and with the use of transitions and handoffs as an out-
come. In the prehospital domain, safe patient transitions
and handoffs are considered important, and a structured
framework will constitute an important contribution to
prehospital safety climate assessment and research.
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